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CONFINING CULTURAL EXPRESSION:
HOW THE HISTORICAL PRINCIPLES
BEHIND MODERN COPYRIGHT LAW
PERPETUATE CULTURAL EXCLUSION
APRIL M. HATHCOCK
Copyright law is the primary means by which society preserves and
protects valued cultural heritage. There is a clear correlation between that
which is protected and that which is valued by society for the continued
enjoyment of future generations. However, this truth becomes troubling
when it is considered that modern copyright continues to espouse
antiquated ideals of acceptable cultural production, to the exclusion of the
cultural property of many historically marginalized people groups. This
article takes a critical look at copyright law to deconstruct the ways in
which historical values and assumptions continue to color the modern
protection of cultural creation, thereby confining cultural expression and
barring protection to the cultural work of the marginalized.
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I. INTRODUCTION
“In the end, we will conserve only what we love. We will love only what
we understand.” – Baba Dioum
Nowhere in the legal world do these words ring more true than in the
area of copyright. Providing ownership rights in the cultural creations of
society helps to ensure their preservation and survival for generations to
come. However, when the very basis for those rights is predicated on
antiquated values that exclude certain groups and types of cultural creation,
then we run the risk of creating a narrowed view of what culture is and how
it is reflected in the things we produce. Copyright was not—and is not—
explicitly concerned with who could produce cultural creations and who
could not, though the implications of copyright protection affect the
opportunities of different groups for cultural production. A legal regime
that confines protection to the particular creative endeavors of a particular
group of people excludes the valuable contributions of those on the outside.
Though these exclusions may be unintentional, they are just as harmful as
if they had been expressly written into the law.
This article takes a critical look at modern copyright law in light of the
values and conceptions highlighted in its early development. From its
initial emergence as a means of protecting rights in the written word to the
rise of the author as a vital hero to the creation of cultural works, copyright
continues to espouse certain assumptions and value judgments about
cultural creation. By examining these assumptions and values through a
critical lens, with the aid of critical race, feminist, and queer theory in
particular, I aim to expose the ways in which these assumptions continue to
work to the exclusion of the creative works of already marginalized groups
of people. As one critical legal scholar has already noted, “[I]ntellectual
property law contributes to determining and maintaining a pervasive set of
power relationships in society.”1 It is essential that we critique those
relationships and deconstruct the ways in which they imbue this area of the
law.
II. BIRTH OF COPYRIGHT AND THE IMPORTANCE OF THE AUTHOR
From its very inception into the canon of legal thought, copyright has
1. Dan L. Burk, Feminism and Dualism in Intellectual Property, 15 AM. U. J.
GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 183, 185 (2007).
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dealt primarily with the protection of the cultural creations of literate,
white, heterosexual males, and this focus continues to color copyright law
today. From the first copyright legislation arising out of the early 18th
century to the succeeding rise of the Romantic author, the value principles
behind providing ownership rights in cultural work have been rooted in the
protection of a certain clearly defined cultural creator and his creation.
A. Cultural Control and the Statute of Anne
The British Statute of Anne of 1710 emerged in the midst of political,
social, and religious upheaval as the very first formal existence of
copyright legislation and served a key function in providing control of the
majority over cultural output.2 The statute was created to provide
protection to authors who were discovering increasing instances of
illegitimate printing and copying of their work.3 The printed word had long
since emerged from the sole province of clerics and religious leaders to
become more accessible to the average person, and printing presses and
booksellers were capitalizing off of the increased demand for printed
material.4
Thus, the Statue of Anne provided for ownership rights to attach to
published written material to permit authors to control the dissemination
and distribution of their work:
Whereas printers Booksellers and other persons have of late frequently
taken the liberty of printing reprinting and publishing or causing to be
printed reprinted and published Books and other writings without the
consent of the authors or proprietors of such books and writings . . . [may
it be enacted that] the Author of any Book or books already printed who
hath not transferred to any other the copy or copies of such Book or
Books share or shares thereof or the Bookseller or Booksellers printer or
printers or other person or persons who hath or have purchased or
acquired the copy or copies of any Book or Books in order to print or
2. See Shelly Wright, A Feminist Exploration of the Legal Protection of Art, 7
CAN. J. WOMEN & L. 59, 67 (1994) (describing the use of copyright limitations as a
means of controlling the distribution of literary and artistic works); Paul Gleason,
Copyright and Electronic Publishing: Background and Recent Developments, in
PUBLISHING AND THE LAW 5, 7 (A. Bruce Strauch ed., 2001) (describing the use of
copyright as a means to control public discourse).
3. Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann. c. 19 (Eng.), in Primary Sources on Copyright
(1450-1900) (L. Bently & M. Kretschmer, eds., 2014), available at
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/anne_1710.asp.
4. See Wright, supra note 2, at 67 (noting that copyright did not arise until “the
commercial development of printing in 15th century Europe made the economic
potential of cultural exploitation feasible”); Gleason, supra note 2 (noting that “both
secular and religious leaders” began regulating printing upon the invention of the
printing press).
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reprint the same shall have the sole right and liberty of printing such
5
Book and Books . . .

There were two main ways in which the Statute of Anne functioned as a
mechanism for controlling cultural creation and dissemination. For one,
there were clear ties between the creation of ownership rights in written
work and the Lockean theory of property rights that had been articulated
just two decades before.6 Authors were imbued by God with the natural
resources, i.e. talents, ability, to create written work through their labor.
They, therefore, had a divine ownership right in the fruits of that labor, i.e.
the published, written text:7
For such an author, everything in the world must be made available and
accessible as an ‘idea’ that can be transformed into his ‘expression,’
which thus becomes his ‘work.’ Through his labor, he makes these
‘ideas’ his own; his possession of the work is justified by his expressive
8
activity.

This divine ownership right naturally excluded those not blessed with the
divine mandate to “subdue the earth.”9 Property ownership only existed for
the literate, white, heterosexual male; therefore, copyright only existed for
that select group. Those who did not have recognized ownership rights in
property did not enjoy the parallel rights in copyright.
The second way in which copyright law controlled the creation and
dissemination of cultural property was through controlling the avenues of
distribution. By limiting the ability of popular presses to reproduce and
distribute written texts, the government was able to control the flow of
information and the development of knowledge.10 The Statute of Anne
frames this control positively as an “encouragement of learned men to

5. Statute of Anne, supra note 3 (emphasis added).
6. See Wright, supra note 2, at 68 (describing the tie between John Locke’s

theory of labor and the promotion of ownership rights in published writing); see also
John Locke, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT ¶¶ 25-51, at 133-146 (Thomas I. Cook
ed., Hafner Press 1947) (1689).
7. See Locke, supra note 6, ¶ 32, at 136-37 (“God, when he gave the world in
common to all mankind, commanded man also to labor, and the penury of his condition
required it of him. God and his reason commanded him to subdue the earth, i.e.,
improve it for the benefit of life, and therein lay out something upon it that was his
own, his labour. He that in obedience to this command of God subdued, tilled, and
sowed any part of it, thereby annexed to it something that was his property, which
another had no title to, nor could without injury take from him.”).
8. ROSEMARY COOMBE, THE CULTURAL LIFE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 211
(1998).
9. See Locke, supra note 7, ¶ 32, at 136 (“God and his reason commanded him to
subdue the earth,” referring to Genesis 1:28 of the Bible).
10. See Wright, supra note 2, at 67; Gleason, supra note 2, at 7.
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compose and write useful books,”11 but the function was much more
restrictive. The definition of “useful books” resided with the government
charged with enforcing copyright law and enabled the monarchy to prevent
the dissemination of what could be considered seditious or heretical texts.12
Thus, the very nature of cultural property was shaped by the majority rule
through the function of early copyright law.
B. Rise of the Romantic Author
With the focus on the written word as a means of cultural exchange and
the development of ownership rights in written text for authors, it is no
wonder that the 18th and 19th centuries saw the rise of the author as a
central figure in cultural creation.13 Prior to this time, authors figured very
little, if at all, in the importance of written text.14 It was the text itself that
carried weight in the realm of cultural relevance. However, as the
argument arose for ownership rights in the tangible mental labors of
authors, the function of the author himself experienced a shift and began to
take center stage.15 No longer were the literate merely concerned with
reading a particular text; they had begun to read the works of particular
authors, which carried new cultural importance. One did not just read the
poems of William Wordsworth; one read Wordsworth himself.16 One did
not study the political philosophy of John Brand; one read Brand.
11. Statute of Anne, supra note 3.
12. See Wright, supra note 2, at 67; Gleason, supra note 2, at 7.
13. See Debora Halbert, Feminist Interpretations of Intellectual Property, 14 AM.

U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 431, 447 (2006) (“During the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries, the idea of the author underwent a transformation. The focus shifted from the
text to the author as original genius and authority of the work.”); Wright, supra note 2,
at 73 (“The individual as ‘creator’ or ‘author’ in the aesthetic sense did not reach full
fruition until the late 18th century.”); Malla Pollack, Towards a Feminist Theory of the
Public Domain, or Rejecting the Gendered Scope of United States Copyrightable and
Patentable Subject Matter, 12 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 603, 606 (2006)
(explaining the importance of the author as to the early development of copyright).
14. See Halbert, supra note 13, at 447 (“It was not uncommon for early texts to be
published anonymously, either to avoid attribution of controversial political ideas, or
because authorship was not seen as essential to the text.”); Wright, supra note 2, at 73,
80-81 (describing the relative unimportance of the author/artist until beginning in the
14th and 15th centuries and culminating in the 19th century).
15. Halbert, supra note 13, at 448; see also Pollack, supra note 13 (describing the
rise of the author as the “fantasy hero of early copyright”); Wright, supra note 2, at 73
(noting that the rise in the importance of the author/artistic was accompanied by
increased recognition of the author/artist’s economic interest in his work).
16. For an interesting examination of Wordsworth’s own view of the Romantic
author, see KEMBREW MCLEOD, OWNING CULTURE: AUTHORSHIP, OWNERSHIP, AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 24-25 (2001).
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In this way, the very identity of the author became tightly enmeshed with
his written creation.17 The development of copyright law progressed as a
means to protect the rights of the prototypical author in the creation of his
vital cultural work. As Debora Halbert writes in her article providing a
feminist interpretation of intellectual property, “Arguments regarding the
author as the creator of original works manifesting a unique personality
were made to justify copyright ownership.”18 Thus, the prevalent
conception of the prototypical author became the mold by which all
cultural creation was judged. This Romantic notion of the author displayed
particular characteristics that shaped thought on cultural creation and
guided the early development of copyright law. In particular, the epitome
of the Romantic author was a heterosexual, paternalistic male, focused on
individual creation.
1. Author as Male
Unquestionably, one of the primary characteristics of the Romantic
author was his gender. While fiction novel-writing was largely considered
a feminine pursuit prior to the development of copyright law, by the 18th
century, all published writing, including that of fiction, had become a maledominated form of cultural expression.19 Women were still permitted to
engage in writing as part of their private interactions and for their
amusement, but the realm of public writing belonged entirely to men. As
Halbert notes, “‘Literature’ was established as a male domain; great works
of literature were not written by women.”20 While women were permitted
to engage in private writing to pass the time, writing of any cultural
significance was reserved entirely for men.
Moreover, the exclusion of women from the arena of true literature did
not simply extend to women as authors. It also encompassed the exclusion
of women as consumers of the written word and those who wrote for a
female audience. This opinion was widely shared among those considered
the great literary geniuses of the time, including Samuel Coleridge:
Coleridge found it important to create distinctions between authentic
authors, like himself, and those who were tainted by the company of
women. In making these distinctions, Coleridge sought to criticize those

17. See Wright, supra note 2, at 77 (“Creation became a productive process
closely identified with an author.”)
18. Halbert, supra note 13, at 448.
19. See id. at 449 (describing the concern about the prior “feminization” of
literature as men took on greater roles in fiction-writing during the 18th and 19th
centuries); Wright, supra note 3, at 82 (describing the overall “masculinization” of
novel-writing during the 18th and 19th centuries).
20. Halbert, supra note 13, at 450.
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aspects of literary culture he did not consider of appropriate artistic
content, primarily texts whose predominant audience (and often authors)
were women. The distinctions created between the authentic and
inauthentic authorship premised upon the romantic notion . . . was
possible at that time, because a masculine sense of authorship was
21
privileged.

Thus, writing of true literary merit had to be created for and by men.
The all-important published text as cultural object could only gain
significance from the masculine touch.22
It is important to note the privilege of male authorship at the time did not
entirely preclude the rise of female authors. Shelley Wright notes,
“Looking back at this period it is possible to rank such female authors as
Jane Austen herself, the Bronte sisters, Elizabeth Gaskell, and George Eliot
as equal or even superior to such male authors as Sir Walter Scott, Dickens,
Thackeray, Trollope, or Wilkie Collins.”23 Nonetheless, many of these
authors were not known or celebrated until long after their deaths, and even
those who did achieve recognition during their lifetimes often did so by
associating themselves with a male personage, such as a husband, father, or
masculine pseudonym.24
Even if some females wrote and even published, it was still questionable
the rights they had under a copyright regime predicated on existing
property rights and the concept of the author as male. Copyright infused
tangible property ownership rights into the realm of intangible ideas.25
That being the case, the gendered norms of property ownership naturally
transferred to the new rights created under copyright law. Married women
were expressly prohibited from owning tangible property during the 18th
and 19th centuries, and at best, their ownership in copyright was woefully

21. Id. at 449.
22. Male privilege in cultural creation also extended to other art forms at the time,

including artists in the fine arts. While women were permitted to create art, to paint,
sculpt, and the like, they were not taken seriously and not permitted into the canon of
“high art.” As with writing, women were permitted to engage in artistic pursuits for
their private amusement, but the realm of cultural creation remained entirely in the
capable hands of men. See WHITNEY CHADWICK, WOMEN, ART, AND SOCIETY 9-11 (5th
ed. 2012) (discussing the gendered notions of art that have permeated art history and
artistic creation).
23. Wright, supra note 2, at 83.
24. See id. at 83-84.
25. See EDWARD W. PLOMAN & L. CLARK HAMILTON, COPYRIGHT: INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 1 (1980) (describing copyright as a means of
“linking the world of ideas to the world of commerce”); Wright, supra note 2, at 66
(“[I]ntellectual property law created, within European cultures, a peculiar collection of
rights in the intangible nature of human creation.”).

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2017

7

American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 25, Iss. 3 [2017], Art. 1
HATHCOCK 03/22/2017 (DO NOT DELETE)

246

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

5/23/2017 8:20 PM

[Vol. 25:3

unclear.26 The same could also be said for those who were non-white.
Ownership of property was a privilege reserved for white men, and this
same principle of property ownership infused the creation of copyright law.
The only way to ensure complete ownership in one’s written work was to
be a white male.
2. Author as Father
The second characteristic of the Romantic author that colored the
development of copyright law was that of the author as the heterosexual
father. As the importance of the author as a central figure to the creation of
a written text emerged, so too did the importance of identifying the
“paternity” of a written text.27 Cultural creation was an act of mental
reproduction, an intangible, almost spiritual, analogue to the process of
physical reproduction.28 He fathered his written work using a feminine
vessel, i.e., a Muse, and exposed it to the world, just as he fathered his
children, in particular his sons, upon his wife and set them loose to take
over the world long after he was gone. In essence, the Romantic author
was seen as the paternal lord over all his written domain, just as he was the
lord of his wife, children, and lands:
This paternal construct is also similar to the position of the bourgeois
family, a political arrangement in which all economic rights inhered in
and flowed towards the father. All family property, including all
property of the wife and children, belonged to the husband/father for him
to exploit as he saw fit . . . Even the persons of wife and children were
themselves “property” completely under the control of the patriarchal
29
head of the household.

In this way, the author/father assumed proprietary authority over his
creation and was responsible for ensuring not only its initial existence but
its subsistence and distribution in the world.
A prime example of this patriarchal imperative can be seen in the right of
reproduction, a stick in the bundle of copyright that has been recognized
from the beginning. The Statute of Anne was created primarily as a means
of protecting an author’s right of reproduction from the illegal usurpation

26. See Wright, supra note 2, at 65-66 (describing the ambiguous ways in which
English courts addressed women’s intellectual property rights).
27. See id. at 79-80 (discussing the rights of paternity in authorship as they
emerged in copyright law); MCLEOD, supra note 16, at 22 (discussing the longstanding
“paternity metaphor” used in relation to creative work).
28. See Pollack, supra note 13, at 606-07 (comparing physical birth with the birth
of ideas into copyrightable works); Wright, supra note 2, at 76-77 (comparing physical
reproduction with the reproduction of copyrighted works).
29. Wright, supra note 2, at 78.
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of printers and booksellers.30 Likewise, copyright law in France developed
out of the French Revolution as a means to protect authors’ rights to
reproduce their own work.31 The prerogative of the author/father to both
create and reproduce his work was a mainstay of early copyright law:
“[F]rom the beginnings of copyright protection the major concern has been
to prevent the production and dissemination of works already owned by
someone else, i.e. illegitimate copies.”32 Just as the bourgeois father
protected his estate and family legacy from the infringing presence of
illegitimate offspring, so too the author/father protected his written work
from the presence of illegitimate reproductions.33 Moreover, this concept
of author as father was deeply ingrained in the creative minds of the time.
Daniel Defoe wrote in 1710 that “A Book is the Author’s Property, ‘tis the
Child of his Inventions, the Brat of his Brain; if he sells his property, it then
becomes the Right of the Purchaser; if not, ‘tis as much his own as his Wife
and Children are his own.”34
As father to his literary creations, the Romantic author was charged with
taking care of his work. He did so by relying on copyright law to protect
his proprietary interests in his written creation.
3. Author as Individual
Another characteristic of the Romantic author that has affected copyright
is the conception of the author as an autonomous cultural creator. The
construct of the author as individual arose from the prevailing theories of
property ownership of the time that were centered on the concept of the
individual owner of private property as distinct from the community. 35
Working as a “solitary male genius,” the prototypical author created
cultural property—in the guise of written text—which was based on public
observations and destined for public consumption but created apart from
30. See Statute of Anne, supra note 3.
31. See Jane Ginsburg, A Tale of Two Copyrights: Literary Property in

Revolutionary France and America, 64 TULANE L. REV. 991, 1014-21 (1990)
(describing how litigation based on the French copyright laws of 1791-93 turned
primarily on a recognition of the author’s reproduction right).
32. Wright, supra note 2, at 77.
33. See id. at 78-80 (highlighting the comparisons between an author’s relationship
to his work and the bourgeois father’s relationship to his children).
34. MCLEOD, supra note 16, at 22 (quoting Daniel Defoe).
35. See Locke supra note 6, at 134; see also Wright, supra note 2, at 68 (exploring
the ties between Locke’s theory of property and the author as individual owner of his
creation); MCLEOD, supra note 16, at 20-21 (discussing the influence of the Lockean
theory of property ownership on the concept of the author as individual); COOMBE,
supra note 8, at 219 (describing how the author comes to own his work as an individual
through the application of his labor).
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societal interference.36 Ever the rational individual, he gathered his
observations and impressions of the world around him, he co-opted the
ideas swirling through the community, and worked independently to give
meaning to those observations and ideas by setting them to paper.37 The
community that served as the basis and the receptor of his work mattered
little in the face of the autonomous author.
In this environment obsessed with individual achievement, copyright law
developed as a means to protect the ownership rights of the autonomous
author:
The existing definition of copyright as both economic and personal
within a political or civil context presupposes that individuals live in
isolation from one another, that the individual is an autonomous unit who
creates artistic works and sells them, or permits their sale by others,
while ignoring the individual’s relationship with others within [his]
community, family, ethnic group, religion . . . Society itself is seen as an
aggregate of anomic individuals, each separate, segregated, fragmented,
38
and existing only as subjects of circumscribed civil rights.

While the community was meant to enjoy the knowledge flowing from
an author’s work, the idea that written text, or any cultural creation, could
be the product of multiple creators was both foreign and undesirable.39 To
the extent that a written creation was the work of multiple authors, it was
evaluated in light of the individual contributions of each author.40 Because
the identity of the author was central to the work itself and because
individualism and autonomy were central to identity, there was no room for
cultural creations that encompassed the shared identities of multiple
creators. For works of joint authorship, each author contributed a bit of his
identity, as typified by his work, in a discrete manner that helped to make
up the whole. All the while, however, the individual identities of the

36. See Wright, supra note 2, at 62 (describing the “solitary male genius, isolated
both spatially and temporally from his community and the background of the art in
which he works”); Pollack, supra note 13, at 606 (describing the Romantic author as an
“autonomous individual who creates without support from his cultural network”).
37. See COOMBE, supra note 8, at 211 (“In these constructions of authorship, the
writer is represented in Romantic terms as an autonomous individual . . . For such an
author, everything in the world must be made available and accessible as an ‘idea’ that
can be transformed into his ‘expression,’ which thus becomes his ‘work.’”).
38. Wright, supra note 2, at 73-74.
39. See Burk, supra note 1, at 188 (describing collaborative work at the time as “a
rare anomaly”).
40. See id. (noting that a joint author has to provide an independent contribution to
the original work); Pollack, supra note 13, at 616 (noting that joint authors “are still
authors because of their individual contributions”); see also, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 101,
201(a) (2012) (outlining the requirements for joint authorship in the U.S.).

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol25/iss3/1

10

Hathcock: Confining Cultural Expression
HATHCOCK 03/22/2017 (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

5/23/2017 8:20 PM

CONFINING CULTURAL EXPRESSION

249

multiple creator-contributors remained intact. The act of cultural creation
was ultimately the realm of the author as individual and could not and did
not reside in the communal sphere.
4. Author as God
Each of the major characteristics of the Romantic author—the author as
male, as father, and as individual—carried deep monotheistic undertones in
keeping with the prevailing Protestant religious sentiments of 18th and 19th
century Europe. The prototypical author, like God, rose above and existed
beyond the masses to breathe life into his creation without the need for any
sort of outside influence.41 Like the Protestant God, he was a male father
with deep patriarchal authority over his creation, controlling both how it
came into being and how it was used upon its dissemination.42 His ideas
arose out of the formless void and were given life in the act of putting pen
to paper and sending that paper out into the world.43 Indeed, the act of
creation took place in a realm deeply rooted in the written word. As related
in the creation story of the Gospel of John, the Romantic author’s work of
cultural production began and ended with the written word: “In the
beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was
God.”44 The creation, this written word, was closely linked to the author/
creator, fully imbued with his unique identity and closely held under his
omnipotent authority. Copyright law, growing out of a cultural tradition
that valued the cultural creator as a god-like being rooted in written text,
carried the values of this tradition from its inception into the present day.
III. MODERN COPYRIGHT AND CULTURAL EXCLUSION
In many ways, modern copyright hardly differs from the copyright
protection that first emerged in the early 17th century in response to the
growing figure of the prototypical Romantic author. The focus of early
copyright law continues to shape how the law functions and is applied
today. Even though copyright has since expanded to include non-written
forms of expression, including the visual and performing arts, it still
focuses on the importance written word. This historical focus, carried into
41. See Wright, supra note 2, at 62 (describing the “solitary male genius, isolated
both spatially and temporally from his community and the background of the art in
which he works”).
42. See id. at 79-80 (discussing the rights of paternity in authorship as they
emerged in copyright law); MCLEOD, supra note 16, at 22 (discussing the longstanding
“paternity metaphor” used in relation to creative work).
43. See COOMBE, supra note 8, at 215 (detailing the process by which the
Romantic author gave form to ideas and made them his own).
44. John 1:1 (KJV).
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the modern world, continues to color the values inherent in copyright
protection and the production and distribution of cultural material. Those
works that do not fit neatly into the mold of published written works by the
male, heterosexual, god-like figure do not receive the same amount of
protection, and therefore value, as those works that do. Modern copyright
law continues to promote the value judgments of worthy cultural
production first established in its infancy, to the exclusion of the cultural
creations of other, minority groups.
A. Focus on the Published, Written Word
The early focus on the published, written word persists in the
development and function of modern copyright law. Born out the realm of
Western cultural values, the insistence on the inviolability of the written
word represents a clear preference for the published text as the valid form
of cultural production. In fact, the very language of copyright law reflects
a focus on the written word over other forms of cultural creation. Derived
from the Latin word cōpia, meaning “abundance,” the term became
synonymous during the 15th century with “transcript” in recognition of the
development and widespread use of the printing press.45 Today, the word
“copy” still signifies, inter alia, “matter to be printed.”46 The very term
used to refer to the rights a creator has in his cultural creation refers
directly to the rights in the “copy,” i.e., the right a creator has over his
printed matter.
Emphasis on written cultural production is also evidenced in the
application of modern copyright law. In some jurisdictions, the law
requires that a cultural expression be fixed in a physical form in order for
copyright protection to apply.47 In other words, there is a preference for
work that exists in the same context as the published, written word—
cultural products that have been printed, or fixed, in a physical medium that
ensures their dissemination and inclusion in the generally accepted
collection of cultural heritage. Under the Berne Convention, the treaty by
which the largely European concept of copyright has been extended
throughout the world,48 fixation is not required for the protection of a work;
however, the treaty does allow for individual states to enact fixation

45. See OXFORD ENGLISH REFERENCE DICTIONARY 317 (2nd ed. 2002).
46. Id.
47. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012); Copyright, Designs, and Patents Act, 1988,

c. 48, § 3(2) (U.K.).
48. See Burk, supra note 1, at 187 (“The systems of intellectual property law
developed by Western industrialized societies . . ., by virtue of aggressive treaty
propagation, now extend to most jurisdictions in the world.”).
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requirements before a work can receive copyright protection.49
Interestingly, the fixation requirement is most prevalent in common law
countries, like the U.S. and the U.K., where copyright as a legal right first
developed.50 In the U.S., a work must be “fixed in any tangible medium of
expression, now known or later developed” to qualify for copyright
protection.51 In the U.K., the fixation requirement is expressed negatively,
denoting the circumstances under which copyright protection does not
apply: “Copyright does not subsist in a literary, dramatic or musical work
unless and until it is recorded, in writing or otherwise.”52 With such clear
statutory preferences for the cultural creation in printed form, the cultural
products of many minority groups fall through the cracks of copyright
protection.
This continued focus on the published, written word as the only true
means of cultural creation results in the exclusion of cultural production of
many non-white, non-Western groups for whom literacy is not a priority
when it comes to the creation of cultural heritage. Cultural production that
focuses on non-fixed forms of expression, such as folklore, oral histories,
and shared rituals, are largely excluded from modern copyright protection,
particularly in nations that first developed copyrights.53 In her survey of
national copyright legislation, Agnès Lucas-Schloetter found that the

49. See Berne Convention for the Protection for Literary and Artistic Works art.
2(2), Sept. 9, 1886, as revised at Paris on Jul. 24, 1971 and amended in 1979, S. Treaty
Doc. No. 99-27 (1986) (“It shall, however, be a matter for legislation in the countries of
the Union to prescribe that works in general or any specified categories of works shall
not be protected unless they have been fixed in some material form.”).
50. See Agnès Lucas-Schloetter, Folklore, in INDIGNENOUS HERITAGE AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 259 (S. von Lewinski ed., 2004) (noting that fixation
requirements are most prevalent in common law rather than civil law countries). The
U.K. developed the first copyright law in the Statute of Anne of 1709. PLOMAN &
HAMILTON, supra note 25, at 12. Copyright law in the U.S. followed shortly after,
beginning with state legislation in twelve of the thirteen colonies from 1783 to 1786.
Id. at 14. Federal U.S. copyright law emerged beginning with the drafting of Article I,
Section 8 of the Constitution in 1789, followed by the first congressional copyright
legislation the year after. Id. at 15-16.
51. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012). This requirement grew out of the constitutional
charge to Congress to “secur[e] for limited Times to Authors . . . the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. From the beginning, U.S.
copyright law has focused on protecting the written word, and such focus extends to the
current copyright statute.
52. Copyright, Designs, and Patents Act, 1988, c. 48, § 3(2) (U.K.) (emphasis
added).
53. See Lucas-Schloetter, supra note 50, at 291-92 (discussing the fixation
requirement of common law countries, like the U.S. and the U.K., as a barrier to
copyright protection for folklore).
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majority of national laws either did not mention folklore at all or explicitly
excluded folklore from copyright protection, automatically relegating folk
traditions to the public domain.54 These national legislations came
predominantly from countries in Europe, as well as the U.S., Canada, and
Australia.55 The exclusion of folk tradition from copyright protection,
whether expressly or by omission, is based on a preference for the
published, written word, and unduly bars the cultural products of
indigenous people groups from the benefits of copyright protection.
For example, in her article on the importance of collective intellectual
property rights for indigenous communities, Angela Riley tells the story of
the Ami people from southern Taiwan and the appropriation of their
cultural folk music by the famous German group, Enigma, during the
1990s.56 Enigma’s hit song “Return to Innocence” featured a performance
of the traditionally Ami “Song of Joy,” performed by one of the
community’s tribal elders.57 The song had not been transcribed; rather, it
was passed down over generations of Ami as part of their cultural
tradition.58 However, the ownership rights for the song now belong to the
Western music group and its producers because Enigma incorporated it into
their hit single, taking an ancient Ami cultural tradition and turning it into a
written, published work—the preferred format for the application of
copyright protection.59
While the Ami and other indigenous groups, who have suffered similar
appropriations of their cultural heritage, can learn a lesson from these
experiences—a new take on the adage “publish or perish”60—the option to
transcribe and publish indigenous cultural creations is not necessarily a
palatable or even viable one. Riley notes:
The “fixation” condition of copyright places an immense burden on
indigenous communities seeking to protect their intellectual property.
The requirement, by definition, excludes all oral literature of indigenous
54. Id. at 284-85.
55. Id.
56. Angela R. Riley, Recovering Collectivity: Group Rights to Intellectual

Property in Indigenous Communities, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L. J. 175, 175-77
(2000).
57. See id. at 176.
58. See id.
59. See id. at 176-77.
60. “Publish or perish” is a common phrase used in academic circles to refer to the
imperative that professors publish scholarly works to ensure their welcome to the
tenured ranks. See generally Eugene Garfield, What is the Primordial Reference for the
Phrase “Publish or Perish”?, 10 The Scientist 11 (1996). I believe it is of equal value
in this context, where cultural products risk being lost to copyright protection, unless
they are published in a fixed, physical form.
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peoples from the paradigm of Western law. In order to satisfy this
standard for copyright protection, indigenous peoples would be forced to
abandon the method of knowledge transmission that goes to the very
essence of Native life. Communicating cultural works from generation
to generation in a written format is foreign to most indigenous societies,
many of which have relied for thousands of years on oral tradition as a
means of documenting history and culture, Oral traditions are the other
side of the miracle of language; they are older and more universal than
writing. The written word isolates, and requires putting spoken language
into contrived, articulable rules. . . . [T]he written form simply cannot
61
capture the nuances of a spoken text.

Requiring that cultural production be fixed in order to warrant protection
perpetuates an age-old exclusion of the cultural traditions of non-Western,
indigenous people groups worldwide.
In addition to excluding the cultural works of indigenous groups, the
primacy of the published, written word in modern copyright legislation
creates an exclusion of women’s traditional, cultural products. Certain
creative endeavors, such as knitting, quilting, clothing design, and food
preparation, have always been, and largely continue to be, associated with
women’s work.62 Unfortunately, these same acts of cultural creation are
also largely excluded from copyright protection because of the requirement
that copyrightable works be fixed, which is the modern equivalent of the
early focus on the published, written word. Designs for knitted work,
quilts, and clothing are generally not covered under copyright laws unless
they are written down or drawn out, like any other traditional literary or
artistic work.63 Creations that are made extemporaneously, without
patterns or plans, would likely not receive protection unless they contain
discrete creative elements.64 Likewise, rituals and processes associated
with food preparation are not covered by copyright laws, though a recipe
for such processes would receive protection once it is written.65
Nevertheless, there are other modes of intellectual property that may
provide protection for these creative endeavors, such as utility or design
patents; however, the means of obtaining these protections are laborious,
time-consuming, and expensive.66 Unlike copyrights, they do not attach
61. Riley, supra note 56, at 195-96 (internal quotations omitted).
62. See Halbert, supra note 13, at 441-46 (discussing knitting and quilting);

Pollack, supra note 13, at 607 (discussing food preparation and clothing fabrication).
63. See Halbert, supra note 13, at 441-46; Pollack supra note 13, at 607.
64. See Pollack, supra note 13, at 609-10 (discussing the “useful articles” rule of
U.S. copyright law, restricting copyright protection to only the highly creative, nonfunctional elements of a functional item).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 608-09.
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immediately upon the creation of the object.67 Thus, many creative works
typically associated with feminine efforts fall outside of the scope of
protectable cultural expression because of the persistent focus on the
published, written creation as the preferred form of cultural production.
B. Focus on the Romantic Author
Modern copyright law also perpetuates the traditional focus on the
Romantic author and his characteristics. This author-centric focus can
readily be seen in the language of the laws themselves. The Berne
Convention, which has been ratified by 172 nations,68 repeatedly uses the
words “author” and “authorship” to refer to the creators of protected works,
regardless of whether those works are written or not.69 In the U.S.
Constitution, copyrights are specifically defined as a means of
“securing . . . to Authors . . . the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings.”70
Likewise, American copyright legislation focuses on
authorship as the basis for copyright protection: “Copyright protection
subsists . . . in original works of authorship . . .”71 In the definitions section
of the statute, and throughout the statute in its entirety, U.S. copyright law
refers repeatedly to the “author” or “authors” of a copyrighted work. 72 In
fact, in the more than 50 terms defined in the first section of the U.S.
Copyright Act, the term “author” or “authorship” shows up more than 20
times, though the term itself is never defined.73 The American law assumes
a knowledge and understanding of authorship and a concomitant
acceptance of the language of the written word as integral part of copyright
protection. The same is true for French copyright law, which is referred to
as the “droit d’auteur” or “right of the author.”74 The Western concept of
the Romantic author continues to serve as the philosophical and practical
basis for modern-day copyright law, as evidenced by the legal language
used.
Not only the author himself, but particular characteristics of the
Romantic author appear throughout the terms of modern copyright law,
67. Id.
68. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works:

Contracting Parties, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG. (Jan. 13, 2017),
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/treaties/en/documents/pdf/berne.pdf.
69. See generally Berne Convention, supra note 49.
70. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added).
71. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012) (emphasis added).
72. See generally, Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (2012).
73. See id. § 101.
74. See generally Code de la Propriété Intellectuelle, [C.P.I] [Intellectual Property
Code] article L121-1-9, L122-1 -12 (Fr.).
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including the conception of the author as individual, as father, and as godlike creator. The author as individual is readily apparent in the copyright
terms governing joint authorship and works created by multiple creators.
Modern copyright law, as in the early days, envisions authorship as an
activity primarily reserved for the autonomous individual, distinct from
group influence. Joint authors are still treated as individuals, even as their
collective contributions make up the whole of the work. Each author
wholly possesses the rights to the work, based on their ability to be
distinctly identified.75 Moreover, determinations of the extent of copyright
ownership rely heavily on the knowledge of each author’s identity. In the
U.K. and France, for instance, copyright duration is calculated based on the
death date of the last known surviving author, emphasizing the importance
of the authors’ individual identities.76 Moreover, joint authorship, while
possible, is often complex and not readily navigable. Joint authors in the
U.S. are not permitted to file online, must pay higher fees for registration,
and must wait nearly twice as long for processing.77 Additionally, the
authors must be individually identified by their full name and the nature of
their contribution to the work, described in detail.78 Thus, even with works
of joint authorship, identification of the author as individual is key in
modern copyright law.
Modern copyright law also emphasizes the perspective of the author as
father. The right of reproduction, so important to the development of early
copyright law, continues to play a major role in the rights accorded to
authors under the modern legal regime. Almost all copyright legislation
explicitly lists the right of reproduction as one of the primary rights
belonging to the author of a work.79 There is also a strong persistence of
the paternity metaphor of creative production that existed in the early days
75. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (“The authors of a joint work are co-owners of
copyright in the work.”); Copyright, Designs, and Patents Act, 1988, c. 48, § 88 (U.K.)
(describing how the rights of joint authors are held separately by each individual
author); C.P.I. art. L113-3 (Fr.) (“Collaborative work is the common property of the
coauthors.”) (translated by author); Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), ss 78-83 (Austl.)
(describing how the rights of joint authors are held separately by each individual
author).
76. See Copyright, Designs, and Patents Act, 1988, c. 48, § 12(4) (U.K.); C.P.I.
art. L123-2 (Fr.); see also Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), s 80 (Austl.).
77. See generally U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE ECO REGISTRATION SYSTEM,
http://copyright.gov/eco (last visited May 8, 2017).
78. U.S.
COPYRIGHT
OFFICE,
FORM
TX
(2012),
http://copyright.gov/forms/formtx.pdf.
79. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 106(1); Copyright, Designs, and Patents Act, 1988, c. 48,
§ 16(1)(a) (U.K.); C.P.I. art. L122-1 (Fr.); Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), s 31(1)(a)(i)
(Austl.).
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of copyright. In France, “[t]he title of author belongs, absent proof to the
contrary, to the one or to those under whose name the work has been
disclosed.”80 Here, the creative work, like a newborn child, claims its
paternity from the one who has given it his name, “absent proof to the
contrary” that could arise from a “paternity test” of sorts, revealing the
work to be that of a different author/father. The paternity of a creative
work also arises in the emphasis on moral rights found in many of today’s
copyright regimes.81 Moral rights ensure an author’s right to protect his
name in his work and control the integrity of his creative offspring from the
presence of “bastard” reproductions or derivatives.82 For the most part, this
moral right is described as the right to attribution, but in other instances,
this right is explicitly referred to as the moral right of “paternity” in one’s
work.83 The paternalistic conception of the author is just as prevalent today
as it was when copyrights first began.
Modern copyright laws also perpetuate the conception of the author as
God, a characterization readily seen in the extensive list of powerful and
long-lasting rights that rest on the author of a creative work. The tight rein
an author exercises over his work is virtually all-encompassing and
practically endless in its scope. Under modern copyright law, the author
possesses exclusive control over the distribution and consumption of his
work: he essentially controls when, how, where, and by whom his work is
disseminated, copied, performed, broadcast, reproduced, or displayed.84 He
also exercises exclusive control over future works that are birthed from the
original creation, such as derivatives and adaptations.85 Thus, not only
80. C.P.I. art. L113-1 (Fr.) (translated by author).
81. Wright, supra note 2, at 79.
82. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(1)(A) (“[T]he author of a work of visual art . . .

shall have the right . . . to claim authorship of that work.”); Copyright, Designs, and
Patents Act, 1988, c. 48, § 77(1) (U.K.) (“The author . . . has the right to be identified
as the author or director of the work.”); C.P.I. art. L121-1 (Fr.) (“The author enjoys the
right to have his name, his caliber, and his work respected. This right is attached to his
identity as a person.”) (translated by author); Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), s 193 (Austl.)
(“The author of a work has a right of attribution of authorship in respect of the work.”).
83. Wright, supra note 2, at 79.
84. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 106 (providing authors the right to reproduce, prepare
derivative works, distribute copies, and publicly perform and display copyrighted
works); Copyright, Designs, and Patents Act, 1988, c. 48, § 16 (U.K.) (providing
authors the right to copy; issue copies; publicly perform, show, or play; broadcast; and
make adaptations of copyrighted works); C.P.I. arts. L121-1 to L121-9, L122-1 to
L122-12 (Fr.) (providing authors the right to reproduce, publish, perform, distribute,
transmit, and attach their names to copyrighted works) (translated by author);
Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), s 31 (Austl.) (providing authors the right to reproduce,
publish, perform, communicate, and make adaptations of copyrighted works).
85. Wright, supra note 2, at 79.
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does the author’s primary work fall under his purview, but the work of
others that originated from his work often does as well. Furthermore,
modern copyright law takes the exclusive and god-like rights of the author
even further than what they were in the past, extending their terms to
periods far beyond the author’s lifetime. Whereas England’s original
copyright statute only provided limited protection to an author to control
the printing and reproduction of his text for a period of fourteen to twentyone years,86 current copyright law extends to periods from fifty to seventy
years after the author’s death.87 These extensive rights, both in scope and
duration, perpetuate the characteristic of the author as a god-like figure
with overwhelming power over the birth and future of his creation.
With modern copyright law continuing to view the author/creator as an
autonomous, patriarchal, god-like figure, the protections it provides contain
distinct holes that fail to include the cultural creations of several minority
groups. For one, indigenous peoples like the Ami,88 for whom oral
traditions form the basis of their cultural creation, do not fall readily into a
legal landscape predicated on protecting an individual, patriarchal, god-like
author. In many indigenous groups, cultural creation is a shared activity,
facilitated through oral transmission of stories, myths, ideas, and important
cultural knowledge.89 Each person contributes to the communal work and
passes it on so that the next person may add their contribution to the mix.
What results at any given moment is a cultural creation that never belongs
to any one individual but is shared across the entire community.90 In fact,
the only true “owners” of the cultural product are often the deities
worshipped by the group. These deities provide the people with the
inspiration for their songs, stories, designs, rituals, etc., and the people in
turn dedicate the resulting cultural products to the deities in gratitude.91 No
one person can claim ownership of or control over a work that is originally
viewed as a gift to the entire community. With such a focus on creation
86. Statute of Anne, supra note 3.
87. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (providing copyright protection for seventy years

after an author’s death for works created on or before January 1, 1978); Council
Directive 93/98/EEC of 29 October 1993, Harmonizing the Term of Protection of
Copyright and Certain Related Rights, art. 1.1, OFFICIAL J. OF EUR. CMTY. No. L 290/ 9
(1993) (requiring copyright protection in European Community Member States to
extend for seventy years after an author’s death); Copyright, Designs, and Patents Act,
1988, c. 48, § 12 (U.K.) (providing copyright protection for fifty years after an author’s
death).
88. See Riley, supra note 56, at 175-77.
89. Id. at 189-91.
90. Id. at 191.
91. See id. (“In indigenous societies, many members believe that ceremonies,
music, and stories are communicated to the tribe by the Creator.”).
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that extends beyond the control of the individual, there is no place for a
modern copyright regime that is predicated on protecting the extensive and
exclusive rights of a clearly identified individual author.
Another area of exclusion that results from modern copyright law’s
focus on the autonomous Romantic author lies in the inequitable protection
of Black music under copyright law. Like indigenous cultural products,
Black music carries a strong tradition of communal development and open
sharing as part of the cultural creative process. Born from the oral customs
of pan-African traditions that favor a group development and dissemination
of cultural heritage and folklore, Black music relies on a deeply iterative
process of creation and re-creation within the community.92 Blues, jazz,
hip-hop, and rhythm-and-blues all arise out of a creative process that
hinges on the sharing of creative elements and styles. Through the practice
of “sampling,” Black musicians often incorporate elements or entire
excerpts of other musicians’ work into their own music, at times doing so
without first obtaining permission.93 While this is a common facet of the
creative process for many Black musicians, it is a practice that would
amount to infringement under the tenets of modern copyright law. The
owner of an original work94 controls all aspects of that work and holds the
exclusive right to reproduce, disseminate, and create derivative versions of
the work.95 Under copyright law, sampling without permission is unlawful,
whereas in the cultural context of Black music, it is a natural part of
creation. Regarding the development of funk music during the 1960s and
1970s, one Black musical artist noted, “We sampled from people who
sampled from us . . . . It wasn’t stealing. That’s how music was made.
Everyone sampled from everyone else.”96 Nevertheless, the restrictive
rules of modern copyright laws have had, and continue to have, a confining
effect on the development of Black music, as more and more artists choose
to forgo widespread sampling as a form of creative cultural expression in
fear of legal reprisal.97 In this way, modern copyright law, with its focus
on the individual, all-controlling author, delegitimizes the creative process

92. MCLEOD, supra note 16, at 75, 77.
93. Id. at 77.
94. This “owner” is often, though not always, the creator of the work, particularly

in the realm of musical recordings. Oftentimes, recording labels own the copyright to
the work created by their artists.
95. Wright, supra note 2, at 79.
96. Interview: Paul Holdengräber with George Clinton, FUNKADELIC, (Oct. 29,
2014),
http://www.nypl.org/events/programs/2014/10/29/george-clinton-paulholdengräber.
97. See MCLEOD, supra note 16, at 94-95 (discussing the chilling effect copyright
law has had on sampling in hip-hop music).
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for a minority cultural form, such as Black music.
One final way in which the Romantic author-centric nature of modern
copyright law functions to exclude minority cultural creation is in its effect
on GLBTQ culture. Unlike ethnic cultural products, queer culture is
generally not developed and passed down through a hierarchical familial
system. It is usually not a culture of patriarchal patrimony, flowing from
father to son. As scholar Marvin Taylor notes, “Gay culture is a culture of
aunts and uncles.”98 Cultural products from the GLBTQ community must
be transferred laterally, rather than hierarchically, to persist and thrive.
Under current copyright law, with such a firm emphasis on the author as
father and supreme creator, such freedom of cultural sharing becomes
stunted. When the protection afforded cultural production requires
extensive permissions for works to be shared, further developed, or fully
enjoyed, a chilling effect on the growth and spread of the underlying
culture arises. This chilling effect is not of as much concern to more socalled mainstream forms of cultural production, but for cultural works that
arise from minority groups, such as the queer community, such an effect
can be overly constrictive.
IV. CONCLUSION
Examining the historical justifications for copyright law unveils a
number of underlying principles that have guided the birth and
development of property ownership over cultural works. In particular,
copyright of the past and today betrays a focus on the development and
protection of the published, written word, created by an autonomous and
all-powerful male author. With the protection of cultural production
manifesting such a distinct value system, cultural creativity becomes
confined to that which falls under the auspices of the written work of the
Romantic author-hero. Works that exist outside of this prescribed area of
valued cultural production are either not protected at all—as is the case
with many traditionally feminine forms of cultural production—or are
protected in such a way that threatens their very existence—as is the case
with Black music and queer cultural works. A critical examination of the
value principles underlying modern copyright laws naturally leads to a
challenge of those principles and the constraining effect they have on
cultural posterity. Historical principles and biases must be challenged and,
in some cases, rejected in favor of more equitable insights. As Halbert
notes, “[T]here would ultimately have to be changes in the law that would

98. Marvin Taylor, Director, Fales Library and Special Collection, Presentation at
the 45th Annual Meeting of the International Association of Labour History Institutions
(Oct. 3, 2014) (on file with author).
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reflect changes in the underlying social structure.”99 Copyright law needs
to be made more equitable, both in its coverage and its application, to
ensure that a broader, more accurate version of cultural reality is preserved
for future generations.

99. Halbert, supra note 13, at 460.
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